HOSENBALL: It’s very unusual for a professional intelligence person who’s still in the intelligence community to write a book–particularly a book that criticizes some of your bosses and raises questions about American policy. What motivated you to write it?

ANONYMOUS: A belief that the senior levels of the intelligence community did not, and in fact still do not, understand the dimensions of the threat posed by the forces led or inspired by Osama bin Laden. They simply refused to address the power of religion in motivating those people who are opposed to our policies. I tried to draw analogies to American history, and to warn that the problem we face, that’s termed bin Laden, is much broader and much more durable than one man, and certainly more lethal than any other threat we face in the world today… I think the time has come to take another look at our opponent and what enables him to continue to thrive in the international environment as it exists today.

Do you think you gave warnings that could have prevented September 11?

I’m not sure that September 11 could have been prevented had the intelligence community operated optimally. It did not operate optimally. What I would say, however, is that I am one of dozens, if not several hundred people, who brought to the attention of senior intelligence-community managers problems with our intelligence services that could have been remedied [such as a reluctance to tell political leaders bad news]. Instead, senior managers, civil servants, either ignored them or refused to act.

Did you warn people sharply that bin Laden had the capability and intention to attack in the United States around the time of September 11?

The people who had been working against bin Laden in the intelligence community since we got serious about it, which was late ‘95, early ‘96, had been convinced before the bombings in East Africa that bin Laden intended to attack inside the United States. Bin Laden has always been a man of words and a man of his word, and to have predicted 9/11 is no more difficult than having paid close attention to the media.

What about the connection between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden? Is there any such thing? Is it significant in any way?

I can only speak for the research I’ve done on that and I found, certainly, that there are reflections of contacts and discussions between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, or Saddam’s regime. I have not found anything in my research that suggests an important tie of any dimension and I also, just from my own study of Al Qaeda, believe that it is a much better organization than any Iraqi intelligence organization and would be loath to have cooperated with a service that it regarded as inferior to itself.

So what you’re saying is that Al Qaeda’s spying is actually better than Iraq’s, or that of any other government in the region?

My inclination is to say their intelligence gathering and counterintelligence abilities are substantial, and probably–given the damage they’ve inflicted on us, compared with the damage inflicted by other entities on us–a much more professional and effective service.

Are you convinced that the United States is going to be attacked on our territory again by Al Qaeda?

I think there’s very little question of that. That’s bin Laden’s goal. He will attack us again in the United States.

Is Al Qaeda capable of acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction?

I don’t know what the answer to that is. We have known since the middle ’90s that they’re aggressively pursuing almost any kind of WMD that they can find, and we also know that they intend to use it. It’s not a deterrent in their eyes. It’s a first-strike weapon. So if they have it, they’ll use it. The question comes down to “do they have it?” And, unfortunately, we may not know until it occurs.