Beijing’s fears over the quality of conversation the next time around are probably warranted. For starters the deep divisions within the administration over North Korea policy will almost guarantee, says one official, that Kelly “will be kept on a tight leash.” Nor has the ongoing dialogue among the six parties to the talks–which include China, Japan, Russia, the United States and the two Koreas–yielded any breakthroughs. Since the August summit, diplomatic efforts have centered on the timing of the next meeting, not substantive differences.
Even the biggest policy shift in the current stalemate–President George W. Bush’s October offer to commit to a multilateral security guarantee in exchange for North Korea’s disarmament–failed to breathe life into the next round. Shortly after Bush’s statement–viewed as a victory for those policymakers who favor a diplomatic resolution to the crisis–administration hawks struck back by making the security offer contingent on a nearly impossible concession–“the full, verifiable and irreversible dismantling” of the North’s nuclear program. “The hard-liners know they can’t fight a public presidential announcement,” says Pritchard. “So they just decided to establish the ground rules for how a security guarantee would be granted.”
For the last month Chinese diplomats have worked furiously with all sides to come up with some sort of joint declaration ahead of the next round. “The Chinese have the correct instinct–if you can agree on the basic goals ahead of time, then the discussion can be much more purposeful,” says Robert Einhorn, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D. C. But those familiar with China’s early drafts say they were too soft on Pyongyang and the details quickly got bogged down–once again–by the demands of Bush administration hard-liners who insisted on their mantra of a “verifiable and irreversible” end to the North’s nukes. “Anyone who has had experience dealing with the North Koreans knows that you can’t do it through the mail,” says Joel S. Wit, the former coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. “That’s what the administration is trying to do, and the Chinese are playing the mailman.”
If the Americans haven’t offered any encouraging signs, the North Koreans just might. Although the North’s motivation for permitting this week’s Yongbyon visit is still unclear, any exchange of information may be a step forward. Interestingly, last month Kim Yong-Il, a senior North Korean diplomat, made a trip to visit that other member of the “axis of evil,” Iran, possibly to consult with Tehran about nuclear bargaining tactics. An even more promising sign may be the fact that the North Koreans are going to put forward their most knowledgeable negotiator on American affairs, Vice Minister Kim Gye-Gwan, at the next round of talks. In Pyongyang’s Foreign Ministry, Kim is the senior member of a select group of advisers who deal solely with the United States, and he may be less inclined to walk away from the table empty-handed than his predecessors. Still, Einhorn cautions, “How constructive the North Korean delegation is doesn’t depend on him as much as it depends on the instructions he gets from the ‘Dear Leader’.” Which probably won’t make China’s diplomats feel any better.
Photo: Standing Firm: So far the United States hasn’t appeared willing to give an inch on the diplomatic front
