It was a telling sign. At a time when America stands isolated and out of sync with its allies, the Bush administration needs all the friends it can get. And it’s finding them, schmoozing fellow right-centrists in a bid to divide (though probably not conquer) the continent. In June, on the way to gaze deep into Vladimir Putin’s soul, Bush swapped jokes in Spain with Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, then swooped into Poland to reaffirm America’s “deep friendship” there. Before the tear gas and firebombs of Genoa, Bush flew to London, bolstering a “special” but strained relationship with Britain. Afterward, it was off to Rome and the warmer welcome of Berlusconi. Yet while Italy, Spain, Poland and even Russia are embracing the American president, it’s hard to escape the obvious. These aren’t the big powers of Europe. France and Germany eye the “cowboy” in the White House with caution. As for the “new” friendships, the big question is how deep do they go–and what can they deliver? By courting them to the exclusion of the biggies, Bush may be playing it smart. But to many it looks like choosing a basketball team from the cheerleading squad–ignoring Michael Jordan and Shaquille O’Neal.
Take Spain. It’s pro-Americanism is probably the most authentic. The two countries enjoy real cultural and economic ties. In June both leaders spoke often of their hispanismo, or shared Spanish-speaking culture. The United States accounts for more than half of all direct foreign investment in Spain, and Spain’s reconquista has made it one of the largest investors in the Americas. All this renders it easier for Aznar to support the United States’ push on missile defense. “Aznar has positioned himself cleverly,” says Francois Heisbourg, director of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. “Spain wants to be in the big-European-countries club. Being able to speak up for the U.S. on issues like missiles makes them feel as if they are.” But what does the United States get out of it? Spain takes over the EU presidency in 2002–good news for Washington. But face it, Spain isn’t even in the G7.
If Spain wins credits for its quiet, tactful approach to the U.S. relationship, Italy and Poland have opted for unbridled boostership. Already scorned within Europe, Berlusconi has little to lose and much to gain by breaking with the other EU nations on issues like missile defense. With more than a healthy dash of wishful thinking, he aims to burnish his standing by becoming the go-to guy in the trans-Atlantic relationship, supposedly displacing Britain. “Berlusconi was much criticized during his campaign by Europe’s center-left politicians,” says political commentator Sergio Romano. “Now he wants to be ’the one’ they have to go to when they need something from America.” Berlusconi also hopes to work some American-style conservative magic on Italy–slashing taxes, cutting government red tape and opening up business to outsiders. Maybe he’ll succeed, notwithstanding a slew of criminal warrants against him and a business empire built less on acumen than alleged mafia ties and cronyism.
No one would mistake Poland for a European player. Yet the Poles’ remarkable economic success over the past decade, coupled with their outspoken support for missile defense, gives them new geopolitical cachet–Washington hopes. By forging alliances with the likes of Spain, Italy and Poland, Bush is “drawing a new map” for a broader and more modern Europe, argues Przemyslaw Grudzinski, the Polish ambassador in Washington–adding that in reaching out for friends beyond the traditional tight circle of “Western Europe,” Bush clearly recognizes how important it is, in politics as well as finance, “to differentiate your portfolio.”
No doubt that’s language ex-businessman Bush understands, perhaps especially as it applies to such traditional friendships as those with Germany and Britain. Prime Minister Tony Blair did his best at their pre-Genoa meeting, offering up images of family togetherness at Chequers and keeping open the possibility of backing the Bush administration on missile defense. And like Berlusconi, though more credibly, he offered to act as America’s “intermediary” in Europe–prompting scoffs from the likes of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, who asked, “Since when did we need a liaison with Europe?” But clearly, Ron and Maggie it was not. Blair asked very tough questions of the U.S. president–not unlike those posed by other European skeptics of the missile shield, including Moscow. How credible, precisely, is the threat? What, exactly, does the United States intend, and how will it go about it? For all the televised smiles, Blair came away with serious reservations. Indeed, some in Whitehall characterized the U.S. administration’s policies as for the birds.
As much as anything, perhaps, this testifies to the limits of a diplomacy of touchy-feely “best friendships.” The Bush administration’s charm offensive may have demonstrated that not all of Europe is aligned against it, and that despite popular rhetoric America is neither wholly “unilateralist” nor entirely isolated. On the other hand, it’s also clear that the United States must engage Europe as a whole if it is to advance its causes, most especially the traditional powers: Britain, Germany and France. If last week’s Bonn summit showed anything, it was the potential value of just this sort of broader cooperation. Japan, like the United States, initially balked at signing the treaty. But Tokyo did not walk away–and in the end the EU conceded nearly all Japan sought. America, meanwhile, was left home alone. That’s a problem that none of Washington’s new “best friends” can fix.
