Fox isn’t really to blame for his failures. His PAN party lacks a majority in Congress and gets no cooperation from the political opposition. In fact, Mexico’s transition to a genuine democracy, with a modern economy supporting it, has been held back by the country’s old institutions and dysfunctional political parties. There are three–the long-dominant PRI, Fox’s right-of-center PAN and the relatively young, left-wing PRD. All are deeply divided and discredited: in last July’s midterm elections only three of every 10 Mexicans voted for these parties.
The Fox team, including this writer, decided from the outset to pursue important economic and social reforms–indigenous rights, energy and tax reform, to name three–without first attempting to modernize Mexico’s institutional framework. That tactic didn’t work. For example, aside from Costa Rica, Mexico is the world’s only democracy that forbids legislators to run for a second term. In addition, Mexico does not have any provisions for calling nationwide referendums on constitutional and international issues, and there is no runoff mechanism for presidential elections. As a result, the reform agenda has stalled.
Mexico’s political parties all reflect the ideological cleavages of another era. They belong to a time when Mexico lacked democratic rule, before its economy was opened to the world and NAFTA was established, and when the cold war defined foreign relations. For 71 years, until Fox’s Inauguration in 2000, the PRI ran everything and constituted the proverbial big tent, where everyone could fit. Today that party’s leaders are devoted exclusively to conserving their perks. Only thus can one explain how free marketers like former presidents Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo shared PRI kinship with energy nationalists rabidly opposed to private investment in oil or electric power; how European-style social democrats and Castroite revolutionaries coexist in the PRD, and how Roman Catholic, anti-American, right-wing ideologues cohabit the PAN with modern social-Christian reformers. No wonder Mexico’s political parties were unable to pass any reforms: there is no consensus within them, let alone among them.
What can be done? First, Fox should make clear that institutional reform is his top priority. He must push for the idea of legislative re-election, for constitutional referendums and for the establishment of a prime minister appointed by the head of state. These moves would promote the existence of a majority in Congress, even if it is not always the president’s. He should make it plain to the nation that without these reforms, Mexico cannot be effectively and democratically governed.
Second, the president should ease monetary and fiscal policy to get Mexico’s economy growing again. The country cannot recover exclusively by hitching itself to the United States. Mexico must boost government spending so that investments can be made in infrastructure, education, law enforcement and anti-poverty programs.
And finally, Mexico should take advantage of its still-immense resource wealth. Within the existing legal structures of the state oil company, PEMEX, oil exports should be dramatically expanded. Mexico could increase exports of crude oil by more than 50 percent by the year 2006, and is already moving in that direction. But Fox should make this goal explicit. Through these three undertakings, Fox might be able to revitalize the political parties so that they face up to their responsibilities, ignite an economic recovery (however modest) and enhance Mexico’s future. The goals are less than what Fox and his team originally dreamed of achieving. But they have the advantage of being feasible. After three years of political stalemate, small steps forward can look large.
