And there is much left to do. For all the euphoria, South Africa’s violence and inequity are too deep-rooted to disappear in a day. Although the margin of victory was far higher than even de Klerk’s boosters had predicted, many whites who voted for de Klerk did so reluctantly–often out of fear that international sanctions would be restored if the “no” option won. “You have to vote with your brain, not with your heart,” shrugged Waldo Schirge, a 32-year-old engineering technician. “None of the arguments for a yes vote really convinced me. But if you vote no, there will definitely be problems. If you vote yes … at least there’s a chance.” Even that much realism was too much to ask of the armed extremists at both ends of the spectrum. Eugene Terre Blanche, the leader of the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), announced plans to expand his organization’s paramilitary Iron Guard units. The referendum, he said, “merely brings South Africa a step closer to the revolution for which the AWB has been preparing itself.” On the far left, the Pan-Africanist Congress dismissed the whites-only referendum as an “obscenity.”
Still, the vote represents a watershed in white opinion: for the first time a majority effectively went on record in favor of the vote for blacks. For this reason, Terre Blanche and other recalcitrants appear isolated and incapable of derailing the multiparty constitutional talks now taking place. Even some prominent members of the pro-apartheid Conservative Party, which opposed de Klerk in the referendum, are now considering joining the negotiations. In that forum, the country’s leaders will try to translate the exultation of the moment into a lasting new political structure. Already, there is consensus on the principle of one person, one vote; a bicameral legislature; an independent judiciary, and the need for a bill of rights. There is general agreement the country should not have an overly powerful central government-and that the white right should not have its own separate homeland, as the Conservatives still advocate.
But major differences remain between Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress and de Klerk’s National Party. After last week’s referendum, many political observers in South Africa expect the prompt formation of a transitional administration encompassing the ANC, the National Party and other political parties (chart). But the ANC and de Klerk disagree on the length of the transition. The president, who is midway through a five-year term, would like to see it take five years; the ANC says 18 months. Last month the ANC proposed the creation of a multiparty council consisting of all the organizations represented at the constitutional talks. This body would sit for six months and wield ultimate power over the de Klerk cabinet and the legislature. Then elections would be held for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.
De Klerk and the National Party are dead set against a constituent assembly. They want the interim government itself to draw up the constitution. De Klerk knows his party would be unlikely to win more than 30 percent of the ballots in a one person, one vote election for a constituent assembly-thereby placing the ANC and its allies in effective control of the new constitution. “The constituent assembly is anathema to the National Party,” explains University of Cape Town political-science professor Hermann Giliomee. “The ANC would bludgeon almost all the other parties into accepting their proposals.”
De Klerk’s concern in the constitutional talks is the protection of “minority rights,” his phrase for the interests and privileges of the 5 million whites. To achieve that goal, the National Party has put forward a number of novel if seemingly unwieldy proposals, ranging from a collective presidency to a legislative chamber loosely modeled on the U.S. Senate that would give whites a veto over future legislation. In making the case for such “power sharing” arrangements, de Klerk points to the need for checks and balances. “If you have 51 percent of the votes you shouldn’t have 100 percent of the power,” he says.
As the political organization most likely to receive a majority of votes in a truly democratic election, the ANC opposes building permanent power-sharing arrangements into a new constitution. At the same time, its leaders recognize the need to give whites some safeguards to head off the possibility of mass white flight from a black-ruled country. One idea under discussion within the ANC is inclusion of “sunset clauses”–informal agreements reached by the ANC, de Klerk and others that would apply for a limited time-such as a pledge to appoint a multiparty cabinet in a government of national unity. Says senior ANC official Thabo Mbeki: “That would signal some sort of reassurance to the army, the police and the white business community about their future.”
Political violence in black townships poses another threat to a successful transition in South Africa. According to South African police statistics, 4,913 people died in political violence in 1990 and 1991. The vast majority of the victims were black. The carnage reached unusually high levels during the three-week, whites-only referendum campaign: an additional 200 blacks were killed. Last week, meanwhile, hundreds of families fled fighting in Alexandra township. The bloodshed seemed fresh evidence that hard-liners within the security forces are fanning the unrest, and the ANC is now using the bloodshed as a reason to resist de Klerk’s demands that it disband its ragtag army, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Mandela asked foreign reporters earlier this month: “How do you abandon your main weapon when the government is failing to put an end to the current violence?” It’s a difficult question, one that in the past both sides in South Africa might have been tempted to settle through violence. But after last week’s dramatic vote, it seemed likelier than ever before that the answers to such questions will be found where they should be: at the bargaining table.
President F. W. de Klerk’s victory in last week’s whites-only referendum clears the way for bargaining over a new constitution for South Africa. An outline of how the transition might work over the next several years.
title: “A New Day Dawns” ShowToc: true date: “2023-01-27” author: “Lucille White”
And there is much left to do. For all the euphoria, South Africa’s violence and inequity are too deep-rooted to disappear in a day. Although the margin of victory was far higher than even de Klerk’s boosters had predicted, many whites who voted for de Klerk did so reluctantly–often out of fear that international sanctions would be restored if the “no” option won. “You have to vote with your brain, not with your heart,” shrugged Waldo Schirge, a 32-year-old engineering technician. “None of the arguments for a yes vote really convinced me. But if you vote no, there will definitely be problems. If you vote yes … at least there’s a chance.” Even that much realism was too much to ask of the armed extremists at both ends of the spectrum. Eugene Terre Blanche, the leader of the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), announced plans to expand his organization’s paramilitary Iron Guard units. The referendum, he said, “merely brings South Africa a step closer to the revolution for which the AWB has been preparing itself.” On the far left, the Pan-Africanist Congress dismissed the whites-only referendum as an “obscenity.”
Still, the vote represents a watershed in white opinion: for the first time a majority effectively went on record in favor of the vote for blacks. For this reason, Terre Blanche and other recalcitrants appear isolated and incapable of derailing the multiparty constitutional talks now taking place. Even some prominent members of the pro-apartheid Conservative Party, which opposed de Klerk in the referendum, are now considering joining the negotiations. In that forum, the country’s leaders will try to translate the exultation of the moment into a lasting new political structure. Already, there is consensus on the principle of one person, one vote; a bicameral legislature; an independent judiciary, and the need for a bill of rights. There is general agreement the country should not have an overly powerful central government-and that the white right should not have its own separate homeland, as the Conservatives still advocate.
But major differences remain between Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress and de Klerk’s National Party. After last week’s referendum, many political observers in South Africa expect the prompt formation of a transitional administration encompassing the ANC, the National Party and other political parties (chart). But the ANC and de Klerk disagree on the length of the transition. The president, who is midway through a five-year term, would like to see it take five years; the ANC says 18 months. Last month the ANC proposed the creation of a multiparty council consisting of all the organizations represented at the constitutional talks. This body would sit for six months and wield ultimate power over the de Klerk cabinet and the legislature. Then elections would be held for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.
De Klerk and the National Party are dead set against a constituent assembly. They want the interim government itself to draw up the constitution. De Klerk knows his party would be unlikely to win more than 30 percent of the ballots in a one person, one vote election for a constituent assembly-thereby placing the ANC and its allies in effective control of the new constitution. “The constituent assembly is anathema to the National Party,” explains University of Cape Town political-science professor Hermann Giliomee. “The ANC would bludgeon almost all the other parties into accepting their proposals.”
De Klerk’s concern in the constitutional talks is the protection of “minority rights,” his phrase for the interests and privileges of the 5 million whites. To achieve that goal, the National Party has put forward a number of novel if seemingly unwieldy proposals, ranging from a collective presidency to a legislative chamber loosely modeled on the U.S. Senate that would give whites a veto over future legislation. In making the case for such “power sharing” arrangements, de Klerk points to the need for checks and balances. “If you have 51 percent of the votes you shouldn’t have 100 percent of the power,” he says.
As the political organization most likely to receive a majority of votes in a truly democratic election, the ANC opposes building permanent power-sharing arrangements into a new constitution. At the same time, its leaders recognize the need to give whites some safeguards to head off the possibility of mass white flight from a black-ruled country. One idea under discussion within the ANC is inclusion of “sunset clauses”–informal agreements reached by the ANC, de Klerk and others that would apply for a limited time-such as a pledge to appoint a multiparty cabinet in a government of national unity. Says senior ANC official Thabo Mbeki: “That would signal some sort of reassurance to the army, the police and the white business community about their future.”
Political violence in black townships poses another threat to a successful transition in South Africa. According to South African police statistics, 4,913 people died in political violence in 1990 and 1991. The vast majority of the victims were black. The carnage reached unusually high levels during the three-week, whites-only referendum campaign: an additional 200 blacks were killed. Last week, meanwhile, hundreds of families fled fighting in Alexandra township. The bloodshed seemed fresh evidence that hard-liners within the security forces are fanning the unrest, and the ANC is now using the bloodshed as a reason to resist de Klerk’s demands that it disband its ragtag army, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Mandela asked foreign reporters earlier this month: “How do you abandon your main weapon when the government is failing to put an end to the current violence?” It’s a difficult question, one that in the past both sides in South Africa might have been tempted to settle through violence. But after last week’s dramatic vote, it seemed likelier than ever before that the answers to such questions will be found where they should be: at the bargaining table.
President F. W. de Klerk’s victory in last week’s whites-only referendum clears the way for bargaining over a new constitution for South Africa. An outline of how the transition might work over the next several years.
